By any measure, the security of critical infrastructure has entered a more fragile era. Energy grids, water utilities, and transport networks are now deeply connected digital environments.
They are exposed not only to physical failure but to cyber compromise that can ripple across economies. At the centre of this shift sits an issue long treated as a technical detail rather than a strategic risk: identity.
Consider a scenario increasingly familiar to infrastructure operators. A vendor located offshore initiates a routine update on an operational technology (OT) system supporting a critical service.
Within moments, alarms trigger across the network. A misconfigured access permission allows unauthorised changes to propagate, slowing production and forcing engineers into reactive mode.
While hypothetical, this situation reflects a growing reality. As the convergence of information technology (IT) and OT accelerates, traditional trust-based access models are proving inadequate for environments where disruption can have public safety, regulatory and national security consequences.
Critical infrastructure in the crosshairs
OT environments were once considered niche targets, however that assumption no longer holds. Industry research shows that nearly 80 ransomware groups impacted OT and industrial control systems in 2024 alone, a sharp rise on the previous year.
Manufacturing alone accounted for more than half of observed ransomware victims, with attackers exploiting the economic pressure created by downtime to extract payment.
For critical infrastructure operators, the implications go well beyond financial loss. Extended outages can disrupt essential services, endanger lives and trigger regulatory scrutiny.
What was historically framed as an engineering or reliability problem has become a board-level governance issue, with executives increasingly accountable for cyber resilience.
A key driver of this risk is remote access. More than half of ransomware incidents in 2024 involved exploitation of remote services such as VPN appliances or remote desktop protocols.
At the same time, attackers have invested heavily in credential-stealing malware designed specifically for OT environments, reflecting a clear understanding that access is the fastest path to operational impact
The modern critical infrastructure operator depends on connectivity. Remote maintenance reduces downtime, cloud integration improves visibility, and third-party specialists are essential to maintaining complex systems.
Yet OT systems differ fundamentally from corporate IT. Many rely on legacy protocols designed decades ago, before cybersecurity was a design consideration. They often require continuous uptime and cannot be patched or taken offline without operational consequences.
At the same time, they increasingly sit alongside modern digital tools, creating hybrid environments that are difficult to secure consistently.
This creates a double-edged sword. A single unmanaged credential, misconfigured access point or orphaned remote session can cascade into system-wide disruption.
In sectors such as water, energy or transport, that disruption may force operators into manual processes, reduce service availability or introduce safety risks.
From network trust to identity assurance
Against this backdrop, the traditional model of broad network access is increasingly viewed as a liability. For critical infrastructure, resilience now depends on shifting from “open” connectivity to identity-centric control.
An identity-driven approach asks three basic questions: who is accessing the system, what are they authorised to do, and for how long?
The ability to answer those questions in real time is becoming essential as regulators, insurers and governments scrutinise cyber preparedness across essential services.
Privileged Remote Access (PRA) reflects this shift.
Rather than granting blanket access through VPNs or shared credentials, PRA platforms aim to enforce least-privilege access, just-in-time permissions and continuous monitoring tailored to industrial environments while enforcing strong credential hygene which limits lateral or unauthorised movement.
Agentless connectivity reduces the need to install software on fragile legacy systems. Support for segmented architectures, such as those based on the Purdue Model, allows organisations to maintain safety zones while enabling necessary maintenance.
Strategic implications for 2026 and beyond
Looking ahead, the implications for critical infrastructure are clear. Cyber risk can no longer be isolated from operational risk. Identity management, once a back-office IT concern, is now a frontline control for protecting physical processes.
This has strategic consequences. Regulators are increasingly focused on demonstrable controls around access and accountability.
Insurers are factoring identity governance into cyber coverage decisions. Boards are asking not just whether systems are available, but whether access to them is properly governed.
The reliance on legacy remote access tools, particularly traditional VPNs, sits uneasily with this environment.
Designed for convenience rather than granular control, they remain a primary target for attackers and offer limited visibility once a connection is established. For critical infrastructure, that lack of oversight is increasingly unacceptable.
The lesson emerging from recent data and incidents is straightforward. In an era of heightened geopolitical tension and escalating cyber capability, resilience starts with knowing who is inside the system.
As organisations modernise OT environments and prepare for future demands, identity is no longer just part of the security conversation. It is the fault line on which the reliability of critical infrastructure now rests.
Beyond Trust, was named a Leader in the 2025 Gartner Magic Quadrant for Privileged Access Management for the seventh consecutive year.
The company also earned Leader status in The Forrester Wave: Privileged Identity Management Solutions (Q3 2025), receiving the highest possible scores in 13 evaluation criteria
